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Inflation has been accused of causing distortionary price and wage fluctuations
(sand) as well as lauded for facilitating adjustments to shocks when wages are rigid
downwards (grease).  This paper investigates whether these two effects can be
distinguished from each other in a labor market by the following identification strategy:
inflation-induced deviations among employers’ mean wage-changes represent unintended
intramarket distortions (sand), while inflation-induced, inter-occupational wage-changes
reflect intended alignments with intermarket forces (grease).
Using a unique 40-year panel of wage changes made by large mid-western
employers, we find a wide variety of evidence to support the identification strategy.  We
also find some indications that occupational wages in large firms gained flexibility in the
past four years.  These results strongly support other findings that grease and sand effects
exist, but also suggest that they offset each other in a welfare sense and in unemployment
effects.  Thus, at levels up to five percent, the net impact of inflation is beneficial but
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  It turns detrimental after that.  When positive,
net benefits never exceed a tenth of gross benefits.
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Monetary authorities around the industrialized world achieved a major disinflation
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Now they must select implicit or explicit inflation
goals for the future.  On the real side of the economy, the choice boils down to weighing
inflation’s purported benefits as it “greases the wheels” of the labor market against the
expected costs imposed by its simultaneous tendency to disrupt (“add sand to”) wage and
price adjustments.1  Empirical guidance for this choice is scant because of the paucity of
modern experience with low inflation rates.  This paper and its companion study
(Groshen and Schweitzer, 1996) are intended to help fill that gap.
Grease and sand effects can both arise from nominal rigidities in wages or prices
in the face of shocks.  Beyond that shared characteristic, however, the effects are
theoretically and empirically distinct.  The grease effect arises from downward rigid
wages (usually attributed to money illusion, social standards of fairness, or pervasive
nominal contracts) in an economy with real economic shocks.  Inflation, then, facilitates
real intermarket price adjustments, reducing the extent to which the nominal rigidities
bind and depress employment and output.
By contrast, the sand effect arises from errors (due to uncertainty and maintained
for a contract period) or idiosyncratic nominal rigidities (due to menu costs or timing
constraints) in the face of aggregate nominal shocks.  Hence, inflation – when not
universally recognized by market participants – raises the variance of intramarket wage or
price adjustments, changing relative prices and wages, which misdirects resources and
lowers output below potential.
As inflation rises, these grease and sand effects offset each other in a welfare
sense.  When inflation is low, their net impact may be positive.  However, at higher rates,
the grease effect is bounded (by the size of real shocks), so sand effects are expected to
dominate.
                                                
1 For further articulation of the grease and sand effects, respectively, see contrasting lectures--both
titled “Inflation and Unemployment”--by James Tobin (1972) and Milton Friedman (1977).2
Individual empirical tests for grease and sand effects (the former in labor markets,
and the latter primarily in retail markets) yield mostly affirmative results.  However,
except for this paper and its companion study (Groshen and Schweitzer, 1996), these
studies have two crucial weaknesses that limit their usefulness for policy.  First, each
paper focuses on only grease or sand, omitting consideration of the offsetting effect and
yielding no estimate of net impact.2  Second, the studies largely rely on out-of-sample
projections to predict the impact of low inflation, because of the scarcity of recent low-
inflation episodes.  The latter is problematic because relationships estimated under
moderate or high inflation may not carry over to low rates.  In particular, inflation itself
lowers incentives to relax rigid wages.  Under persistent low inflation, competition
should pressure employers to adopt more flexible practices (such as contingent contracts
or bonus and incentive pay), which could mitigate inflation’s grease or sand effects.
Our two studies are the only ones to include coverage of low-inflation years (in
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1990s) and to estimate and compare simultaneous grease and sand
effects.  We find empirical evidence of both effects in the labor market, and that the net
impact of inflation is positive but statistically indistinguishable from zero at low levels of
inflation, turning negative at rates of over 5 percent.
This study has two aims:  to further test the identification strategy for grease and
sand used in Groshen and Schweitzer (1996), and to expand our understanding of the
impact of low inflation by adding four low-inflation years (1993 through 1996) to the
data.  We ask whether sand effects are actually distinguishable from grease effects, and
large enough (even at low-to-moderate rates of inflation) to offset estimated grease
effects.  We also use the most relevant evidence available (the late 1950s, early 1960s and
1992 - 1996) to focus on the labor market effects of low inflation in the US.
We proceed as follows:  The next section relates the formal model of grease and
sand presented in Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) to wage-setting procedures in large
firms and then summarizes that paper’s strategy and main findings.  The third section
describes the updated data set.  The fourth section presents a decomposition of wage
                                                
2 Another exception, Kahn (1995), notes evidence of “menu cost” (sand) effects, but focuses on
the grease effects.3
changes and examines the distribution of those components under high and low inflation.
The fifth section re-estimates the basic statistical model from Groshen and Schweitzer
(1996) on the extended sample and tests for the sensitivity of the results to the following:
separating inflation from productivity, adding controls for trend and unemployment, and
splitting inflation into its expected and unexpected components.  The sixth evaluates net
unemployment implications of our results and compares our results to two previous
grease-only studies.  The final section concludes.
2.  Grease, Sand and Wage-Setting Practices Under Low Inflation
This section discusses how inflation acts on wage-setting in large US firms to
produce the grease and sand effects, and reviews findings from Groshen and Schweitzer
(1996), in order to set the stage for the empirical work that follows.
a.  A Narrative Model of Inflation’s Impact on Large Firms’ Wage Adjustments
Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) develops a simple formal model to demonstrate
that inflation could simultaneously raise both intentional and distortionary wage changes.
The model also motivates empirical tests of the effects.  Here, we show how the model
incorporates institutional wage-setting practices that salary surveys (such as the one
analyzed here) were designed to inform.  This description is based on discussions with
personnel executives, compensation textbook descriptions of the process, and
compensation managers' responses to surveys conducted by Levine (1993) and others.3
The main elements of the Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) model are simply listed:
The starting point is a standard efficiency wage model (where firms optimize both over
labor and wages), in the context of inflation and distinct occupational labor markets.
Grease and sand effects result from two added complications:  (1) Inflation causes firms
to commit and correct errors as they set annual wage levels.  (2) Nominal wages are rigid
downwards, despite the presence of relative wage shocks among occupations.  The net
result is that if the sand effect exists, it can be detected as an inflation-induced increase in
                                                
3 Examples of compensation policy references that describe and recommend these practices
include Hills(1987), Milkovich and Newman (1990), and Wallace and Fay (1988).4
inter-employer wage-change variation.  Similarly, if the grease effect exists, inflation
raises inter-occupational wage-change variation.
To see how the model’s elements correspond to observable features of salary
administration, it is crucial to recognize that most large US firms use a two-step process
to set annual wages.  In the first step, senior management sets the average nominal
adjustment for the work force -- using inflation forecasts, labor market salary surveys, and
financial, sales, and product price projections.  In the second step, the annual “pool” for
raises is divided among workers.  During each phase, a different layer of management
aims to maintain the company’s profitability by not over- or under- paying employees, to
prevent both unwanted turnover and excessively high labor costs.
To guide their decisions, many employers share wage information through
community, industry and occupational wage surveys.4  A Conference Board study
(Freedman, 1976) found that while compensation executives considered diverse factors in
their determination of wage adjustments, area salary surveys and cost-of-living measures
were particularly prominent.
At the first step of the process, employers usually pursue their wage-setting goal
by maintaining parity with other employers they consider comparable.  The organizational
behavior literature describes firms as choosing a long-term labor market “position.”  This
stable wage differential between the firm and alternative employers yields a work force
quality or effort differential consistent with the firm’s overall production strategy.  This
wage-setting behavior closely mimics that described in the efficiency wage literature.
Indeed, the efficiency wage hypothesis is most often used to link wages and job
characteristics in large, bureaucratic workplaces.  Furthermore, the model’s prediction
that alternative wage movements feed directly into the firm’s wage adjustments is
consistent with descriptions of firm wage-setting exercises found in textbooks for
practitioners.
The Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) model represents sand with a single inflation-
correlated term.  This term can reflect employers’ deviations from their intended wage
                                                
4 See Groshen (1996) for a description of salary surveys and their use in research.5
differentials because they disagree on the expected rate of local wage inflation.5  That is,
firms’ compensation administrators err more often in calculating the “correct”
adjustments as inflation rises because their uncertainty rises simultaneously.
This assumption is consistent with the observed tendency of inflation to raise
forecast and actual goods price-change dispersion (Ball and Cecchetti, 1990 and Lach and
Tsiddon, 1992, respectively).  Indeed, it is implausible that firms’ wage-change forecasts
would be more accurate than their other price-change forecasts, since there would be
strong incentives and little cost to sharing such information within the firm.  Furthermore,
uncertainty in market wage adjustments may well exceed that of the goods markets due to
the limited samples, retrospective nature, and infrequency of salary surveys.  Widespread
reliance on employer salary surveys (rather than direct measures of inflation--such as the
Consumer Price Index), confirms compensation managers’ concerns over matching
competitors' actions rather than matching some simple, easily-observed level of goods
inflation.6 Of course, if a region’s employers agreed on some expected inflation rate that
proved incorrect, this rate would effectively operate as the true rate and not distort
relative wages among the individual firms.
Supplementing the effect of errors, employers may also differ in their menu costs
of adjustment because of differences in their salary administration rules, fiscal year
calendars, or length of union contracts.  Or, some may face cash or other constraints that
temporarily prevent them from adjusting fully.  These variants yield idiosyncratic lags
that are also captured by the inflation-correlated term in the model.
Since these lags or mistakes and corrections affect the firm’s entire salary budget,
the existence of the sand effect is indicated by growing dispersion among employers'
wage adjustments (controlling for skill mix) as inflation rises.  These unintended
variations alter firms’ wages relative to the market, which can reduce profitability via
high labor costs, unnecessary layoffs, work force dissatisfaction, or quits.  Note also that
                                                
5 By contrast, if employers were to agree on some expected inflation rate that proved incorrect, this
rate would effectively operate as the true rate and would not distort relative wages among the individual
firms.
6 This focus makes sense because of regional divergence in wage levels and relativities (and the
lack of precision of local CPIs), and because goods price movements understate average nominal wage
changes by the growth of labor productivity.6
any idiosyncratic errors or lags that affect the next step (when the budget is divided
among occupations), would tend to cancel out across employers, so they do not raise
inter-occupational wage change dispersion.
Employers could also respond to uncertain inflation by raising their wage-change
frequency, allowing use of more current information.  However, this is costly, particularly
for bureaucratic firms, or those with union or other fixed-term contracts.  Similarly, the
desire to avoid inflation-induced fluctuations may encourage companies to spend extra
money gathering information to improve their decisions.  These avoidance strategies also
misdirect resources from their most productive uses and suggest that our metric may
underestimate true sand effects.
By contrast, inflation’s grease effects (its purported benefits) are conferred during
the second step of the wage-setting process--the decentralized step.  At this stage,
corporate divisions allocate their shares of the total salary budget among workers, to
match market wages and reward performance.
Divisions adjust wage differences among the occupations they employ to reflect
shifts in training needs, working conditions, technology, product prices, demographics, or
other input prices.  In a well-functioning market, these inter-occupational wage changes
influence people’s job-search and training decisions.  However, the division’s annual
decision may be altered by two constraints:  the financial requirement that they not
overspend their budget, and a social (or bureaucratic) restriction on cutting the wages of
good performers who face unfavorable labor market conditions -- even when inflation is
low.  The reasons posited for this “downward wage rigidity” are money illusion,
personnel practices designed to promote fairness, and the importance of fixed dollar
payments in workers’ expenditures.
For simplicity, the Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) model imposes complete
downward nominal wage rigidity in a single-step process.  This assumption could be
relaxed in several ways without loss of generality.  For example, in some situations the
lowest acceptable raise may exceed zero.  The higher the floor, the larger is the grease
effect.  Alternatively, some portion of pay or the workforce may not be subject to7
downward rigidity.  As long as the flexible component is small relative to the size of
normal shocks or the workforce, the results obtained hold.
Even more generally, downward rigid rules may also constrain wage raises during
periods of low inflation.  When the compensation budget binds, it limits wage
adjustments to those that can be balanced by restraint on another’s raise.  While the
traditional story of rigid wages stresses the unemployment consequences, a firm might
choose to limit higher-than-average desired increases rather than lay off workers,
particularly in the short run.
As an illustration, suppose the firm had two workers, each earning the same
amount, but real wages for one’s occupation were rising by one percent per year, while
the other’s were falling by one percent.  Suppose also that the wage bill was restricted to
grow at the rate of inflation, while firm policy prevented pay cuts.  Then under zero
inflation, neither worker would get a raise -- if this can be done without inducing quits.
Indeed, the employer might layoff the worker in the declining occupation, if there were no
complementarities in production.  By contrast, in a year with one percent inflation, the
worker in the slow wage-growth job would get no raise, while the other would receive a
two percent hike, and there would be no incentive for layoffs.
Thus, low-inflation environments reduce the variance of occupational wage
adjustments in two ways.  First, they eliminate some wage cuts in declining occupations.
Second, they restrain increases for other workers--in order to balance the compensation
budget.  Such restrictions will be evident in intentional components of wages that require
occasional, substantial adjustments.  The obvious candidate is occupational wage
adjustments.  If wage rigidity simply eliminated wage changes below a cutoff, a test for
truncation would adequately verify rigidity.  However, the realistic complications
described above or differences in firms’ inflation expectations could distort that
implication.  For this reason, and to maintain symmetry in our analysis, we look for wage
rigidity’s effect on the standard deviation of occupational adjustments, because truncation
always implies a reduced variance.
In social welfare terms, the grease effect predicts that higher inflation allows
divisions to lower real wages for workers facing unfavorable market conditions.  That is8
inflation avoids costly alternatives such as layoffs, lowering other workers’ raises (risking
quits), maintaining prices above competitors paying the market wage (risking market
share), and/or accepting lower profits.  Then wage signals travel more rapidly throughout
the economy, reducing layoffs and providing accurate incentives to workers choosing
training and career paths.
A final realistic feature of our model is that it recognizes that general increases in
labor productivity can substitute for inflation in both the grease and sand stories.  Since
broad-based productivity growth shifts out market demand for labor, firms must match
other employers’ productivity-based adjustments -- along with inflation -- in their average
nominal wage adjustments.  In light of this, we measure external wage change as the
change in output prices plus the general increase in labor productivity.  Ceteris paribus,
this sum approximates the average nominal wage growth in the economy.
Thus, the main features of the formal model accord well with large firms’ actual
wage-setting practices.  This supports confidence in the identification strategy generated
by the model -- that inflation’s negative effects can be distinguished from its positive
effects because they affect different components of wage changes.  On the negative side,
inflation adds unintended variation to firm-wide salary adjustment budgets (sand).  On the
positive side, it frees divisions from downward nominal wage rigidity -- allowing firms to
adjust wages more rapidly to reflect market conditions for particular occupations (grease).
In the following section, we summarize the measures of these effects obtained in Groshen
and Schweitzer (1996).
b. Summary of Previous Results
Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) distinguishes inflation’s positive labor market
effects from its negative ones in the wage changes observed in a unique, long-lived panel
of occupations and employers from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community
Salary Survey (CSS).
The analysis begins by characterizing wage changes in the CSS and extracting
common occupational and employer components in each city and year.  As confirmation
of the consistency of the model with observables, we find that:  1) As predicted, annual9
mean wage adjustments are highly correlated with external measures of inflation and
productivity growth.  2) An ANOVA of annual wage changes verifies that employer and
occupation components both play statistically strong, independent roles.  3) Over time,
the dispersion of employer and occupation adjustments display a correlation coefficient of
only 0.48;  these two components of wage change dispersion often move independently.
Next, we regress the standard deviation of the estimated occupation and employer
components on external nominal wage growth (inflation plus productivity growth).  Since
productivity growth, unlike inflation, has other unambiguous benefits and is not a direct
monetary policy target, we focus on implications for inflation policy.
The empirical results suggest that potentially beneficial grease (as measured by
the standard deviation of occupational wage adjustments) shows a diminishing
relationship with nominal wage growth.  These potential benefits taper off after inflation
rates of about 3-4 percent (assuming labor productivity growth of 1
1/2 percent, the
average rate over the period observed).  By contrast, disruptive sand from additional
inflation (as measured by the standard deviation of employer wage adjustments) rises
about twice as quickly as occupational variation with respect to inflation and shows less
evidence of a turndown at inflation levels over 7 percent.  The robustness of these results
is confirmed by nonparametric, filtered, and panel versions of the tests.
We then combine the two gross results to consider the net (i.e., grease minus
sand) impact of inflation.  This is possible if the two effects are measured in the same
units on the same data, are equally well identified, and subject firms to symmetric losses.
Assuming productivity growth of 1
1/2 percent, net benefits peak at 2
1/2 percent inflation.
Maximum net benefits amount to about a tenth of the gross benefits, and are not
statistically different from zero.  At inflation levels above 5 percent, the disruptive effects
of inflation on the labor market overwhelm the positive impacts, and net benefits turn
negative.  Thus, in contrast to many grease-only studies, we conclude that the labor
market provides little guidance on the preferred inflation goal at the low end of the range.10
3.  The Community Salary Survey
This study uses an updated version of the annual private salary survey data
described in Groshen and Schweitzer (1996).  The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
has conducted the CSS in Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh since 1927 to assist its
annual salary budget process.  The analysis data set reports wages for detailed
occupations, by employer from 1956 through 1996.
The data set has three major selling points for this study.  First, the wages
recorded here are less prone to random reporting error than household data because they
derive from administrative records.  Second, the data are longer-lived than any source
previously investigated.  Third, because employer data records wages in the way most
meaningful to firms, it is preferable to household or aggregate data for studying impacts
on firms’ wage-setting.  This perspective appropriately reflects the strategies used by
firms to adjust wage bills (e.g., promotions, reassignments or reorganization), but not the
potentially confounding means used by workers individually to adjust their earnings (e.g.,
taking second jobs or changing hours).
Table 1 describes the dimensions of the CSS wage-change data set.  From wage
levels, we compute 75,765 annual wage changes for occupation-employer (“job”) cells
observed in adjacent years.7  Each observation gives the change in the log of the mean or
median salary for all individuals employed in an occupation-employer cell.8 Cash bonuses
are included as part of the salary, although fringe benefits are not.
Participants in each city are chosen to be representative of large employers in the
area.  Until 1995, the number of companies participating trended up from 66 to over 80
per year (see table 2).  On average, they stay in the sample for almost 13 years each.
                                                
7 Job-cell-year observations where the calculated change in log wages exceeds 0.50 in absolute
value are deleted from the sample on the assumption that most of these arise from reporting or recording
errors.  Over 1,000 observations are imputed from cases where job-cells are observed two years apart.  The
imputed one-year changes are simply half of the two-year differences.  Many of the results reported here
were also run without the imputed observations.  Their inclusion does not affect the results.
8 Only means were recorded before 1974.  Since medians should be more robust to outliers, our
results use means through 1974 and medians for the years thereafter.  Comparison of the coefficients
estimated separately for means and medians for some years where both were available (1974 and 1981-
1990) suggests that they are highly correlated (correlation coefficients of .97 to .99).  However, coefficients11
Since each participant judges which establishments to include in the survey, depending on
its internal organization, we use "employer," a purposely vague term, to mean the
employing firm, establishment, division, or collection of local establishments for which
the participating entity chooses to report wages.9  The industries included vary widely,
although the emphasis is on obtaining employers with many employees in the occupations
surveyed.10
The occupations surveyed (43 to 100 each year) are exclusively nonproduction
jobs that are found in most industries, with relatively high inter-firm mobility, and well-
developed markets.11 Many occupations are divided into grade levels, reflecting
responsibility and experience.  In the analysis, to avoid unnecessary restrictions, we
consider each occupational grade in each city to be a separate occupation.  Thus, the total
number of "occupations" in table 2 exceeds the number surveyed.  For example, 83
occupational grades were surveyed in 1996, yielding 240 occupations across the three
cities.  On average, each employer reports wages for about 27 occupations.
Although the CSS is conducted annually, the month surveyed has changed several
times.  Throughout the paper, results for any year refer to the time between the preceding
survey and the one conducted in that year -- usually a 12-month span, but occasionally
not.  All data merged in have been adjusted to the extent possible to reflect time spans
consistent with those in the CSS.
We also incorporate standard measures of inflation and national output per hour in
our analysis (see table 3).  As a measure of general inflation experienced in the country,
we use percentage changes in the monthly averages of the Consumer Price Index for all
                                                                                                                                                
estimated with medians show more variation than those estimated on means and are more highly correlated
over time, consistent with medians being a more robust measurement of central tendency.
9 Some include workers in all branches in the metropolitan area; others report wages for only the
office surveyed.  Since a participant's choice of the entities to include presumably reflects those for which
wage policies are actually administered jointly, the ambiguity here is not particularly troublesome.
10 The employers surveyed include government agencies, banks, manufacturers, wholesalers,
retailers, utilities, universities, hospitals, and insurance firms.
11 They include office (e.g., secretaries and clerks), maintenance (e.g., mechanics and painters),
technical (e.g., computer operators and analysts), supervisory (e.g., payroll and guard supervisors), and
professional (e.g., accountants, attorneys, and economists) occupations.  Job descriptions for each are at
least two paragraphs long.12
Urban Workers (CPI-U).  Our labor productivity measure is the Nonfarm Business Sector
Output per Hour Worked (pre-chain-weights).
Mean log wage changes among the three cities are highly correlated and closely
track national wage trends.  Figure 1 shows the strong correspondence between the CSS
three-city mean log wage change and our simple measure of nominal wage change
(labeled CPI+) -- which equals the sum of inflation (CPI-U) and aggregate labor
productivity movements.  The new observations (1993-1996) are all years in which the
mean wage change in these three cities did not keep pace with CPI+.  However, Groshen
and Schweitzer (1996) shows that correlations between mean CSS wage adjustments and
the CPI-U and CPI+ (0.84 and 0.74, respectively) are quite high.  The wages in the CSS
largely adhere to national trends, and thus may enlighten us about the behavior of wages
in the nation as a whole.
4.  Wage Adjustment Components
a.  ANOVA of CSS Wage Changes
Table 4 presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of wage adjustments in the
updated CSS sample to verify the existence of distinguishable employer and occupation
components.  The following fixed-effects regression model is used to decompose log
wage changes (wf j):
wf j = a + b Df  + g Dj + mf j,  for each locality and year, (1)
where b and g are coefficient vectors for matrices of dummy variables (Df and Dj)
referring to the cell’s firm and occupation, respectively.  The b vector measures
deviations from the mean wage change across the firm’s complement of occupations; i.e.,
the general pricing deviation developed above (sand).  The g vector represents average
occupational wage adjustments made in the market.
The results are little changed by the addition of the new data.  The first two
columns list sources of variation and their associated degrees of freedom.  Control for
mean annual changes in three cities absorbs 112 degrees of freedom.  To allow13
occupational wage patterns to diverge in the cities, occupation and city are interacted,
accounting for 6,186 degrees of freedom.  Employers’ mean annual wage movements
absorb another 3,001 degrees of freedom.
The third column lists each source’s marginal contribution to the model sum of
squares (over the contributions of the sources listed above it on the table).  We choose
this method of presentation -- similar to a stepwise regression -- because of its parsimony
when the data are unbalanced (i.e., the occupations in each firm vary).  Since the joint
effects in wage-change variation between occupation and employer are minuscule, the
order of presentation is unimportant.
All together, the model accounts for 27.4 percent of the variation in annual wage
adjustments.  The residual variation is presumably due to compositional changes,
individual merit raises, and perhaps, commingled grease and sand effects.  The fifth
column of the table shows that slightly more than one-fifth of the equation’s explanatory
power stems from changes common to all job-cells in each year.  Intercity differences
account for little variation.  Occupation-wide changes, on the other hand, constitute more
than one-quarter of observed variation.  By far the strongest effect is employer-wide
changes, which account for close to half of the explained variation and 12.4 percent of
total variation.  F-statistics for these five sources of variation are all significant at the 1
percent level.
This decomposition suggests that the institutional model described above fits the
data: occupation-wide and employer-wide variations in wage changes are large and
statistically distinguishable from each other.  In particular, the firm-wide wage
movements are interesting because employer wage differentials are quite stable over long
periods of time (Groshen, 1989).  Thus, variation here suggests errors and corrections.
b.  Inflation’s Impact on the Distribution of Wage Change Components
Since the grease hypothesis is based on downward (one-sided) wage rigidity,
while the sand hypothesis posits symmetrical rigidities, inflation may affect the
distribution (as well as the variance) of occupation and employer wage components
differently.  In particular, there is no reason to think that the distribution of employer14
deviations under low inflation would not be symmetric, simply showing thinner tails than
the distribution of changes under high inflation.  By contrast, downward wage rigidity
under low inflation implies left-hand truncation of occupational wage changes, which
may vary among firms.  This effect suggests that low-inflation environments will skew
the distribution to the right, with little impact on the right-hand tail -- to the extent that
the lack of cuts is not balanced by corresponding restraint in raises.
Figures 2A and 2B plot the distribution of employer and occupation wage
adjustments during years of high (over 5 percent) and low (under 3 percent) inflation.
Consistent with our previous results, in both panels, higher inflation is associated with
higher variation.  Indeed, Kolomogorov-Smirnov tests resoundingly reject equality
between the high- and low-inflation distributions.  Second, we note that the two sets of
distributions do not look the same -- providing more evidence of a difference between the
two components.
Third and most important, the density plot for employers (top panel) shows
thinning in both tails as the level of inflation falls.  By contrast, the density plot for
occupations (lower panel) shows a marked, asymmetrical loss of small negative
adjustments under low inflation -- consistent with truncation.  The tails are virtually
unaffected.  The fact that inflation affects the components' distributions differently, in
ways consistent with the identification strategy, helps bolster confidence in both the
strategy and the existence of grease and sand effects.
5.  Regression Results
In this section, we further examine links between price changes and the variability
of the b and g vectors (the firm and occupational coefficients estimated in equation [1]
and summarized in table 4), through regressions of their employer/occupation-cell
weighted standard deviations on the level of inflation.  The sand and grease hypotheses
predict that the standard deviations of the b and  g vectors (respectively) increase with the
level of inflation.  A priori, we also expect the standard deviation of occupational wage
changes to be bounded by the size of usual shocks to the labor market, whereas disruptive15
firm variation may be unbounded under high inflation.12  The regressions reported in this
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where stdoct and stdemt (occupation and employer wage-change dispersion, respectively)
are regressed independently on some proxy (or proxies) for annual wage movement,
represented here by DX.13  The simple two-term quadratic expansions allow curvature in
these estimates, while remaining easily interpretable.  To further aid interpretation, the
bottom row of each table also reports the implied value of the independent variable at the
maximum.
After considering the impact of expanding the sample, we compare a variety of
specifications.  Then we consider the likelihood that inflation might aid the intended
adjustment of firm (rather than occupation) wage differentials.
a.  The Effect of Sample Extension
Table 5 shows the impact of the new observations, using the CPI+ measure of
external nominal wage change.  The first and third columns report basic regression results
from the original Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) sample.  The second and fourth
columns report results from the extended sample.
The qualitative results (inverted U-shaped relationships, with an earlier peak for
occupation) are unchanged, but some interesting effects are evident.  First, the employer
(sand) effect now peaks at an even higher inflation rate, while the occupation (grease)
effect tops out at slightly lower inflation rate than before.  Thus, the contrast between the
two is more marked.  Second, however, the explanatory power (R
2) of both equations has
fallen (particularly for the occupation/grease effect) suggesting that extrapolations from
the quadratic form may not fit well at the current low inflation rates.
                                                
12 Expanding indexation could bound the sand effect, as suggested by Drazen and Hamermesh
(1986).
13 While the two-stage nature of this procedure may raise standard errors in equation (2), it will not
influence coefficient estimates unless the first-stage estimation errors are correlated with our measures of
inflation.  We have no a priori reason to suspect such a correlation.16
Figures 3A and 3B plot the new estimated relationships, along with non-
parametric (smoothed) versions of the same relationships.14  The smoothing is similar to
allowing a large number of quadratic terms, and continues to suggest that the
parsimonious models in table 5 capture most of the curvature in these relationships.  The
frequency of observations is indicated (except for overlaps) by the density of tick marks
for the smoothed estimates.
The two figures also show tick marks for the new observations.  In figure 3B, the
marks are concentrated far above the predicted relationship.  This pattern indicates that
interoccupational wage flexibility has consistently exceeded the levels that would be
expected by extrapolation off the historical relationship.  No similar evidence is
noticeable for employer adjustments in figure 3A.  These results support the hypothesis
that downward wage rigidity has relaxed recently in large employers -- precisely the
segment of the labor market where wages would tend to be the most rigid.
b.  Freeing the Coefficients on CPI and Productivity
Use of CPI+ in the regressions in table 5 imposes the same coefficient on
productivity and inflation.  While theory provides a strong rationale for this approach, the
restriction is empirically testable.  One practical reason to suspect a difference in
estimated relationships is that productivity is highly variable and arguably measured with
a great deal of error.  Thus, when freed up, we expect coefficients on output per hour to
be biased toward zero and have high standard errors.  Table 6 reports results for some
variants that separate the two underlying series.
The first specification repeats CPI+ results from table 5, for comparison purposes.
The second shows the impact of separating the two series in quadratic form.  Employer
wage-change dispersion is no better modeled with the terms separate than together, while
the separation more than doubles the adjusted R
2 of the model of occupational
adjustments.  But, the third specification (CPI-U and its square alone) suggests that in
both cases, the shape of the relationship is mostly determined by inflation -- output per
                                                
14 We use the LOWESS smoother with a bandwidth of one, recommended by Cleveland (1979),
for its robustness with respect to both axes.  Various bandwidths for 0.2 to 1 were tried, with little variation17
hour contributes little extra.  The implied maxima shown at the bottom suggest that it is
in their relationship to the CPI-U that the employer and occupation adjustments differ
most strikingly.
The final model shown takes an intermediate approach.  It assumes that the
difference between the results for output per hour and CPI-U stems mostly from poor
output measurement.  In both cases, the fit improves and the coefficient is negative,
suggesting that the term may absorb some of the downward bias caused by productivity
mismeasurement.
These decompositions of the impact of mean nominal wage change are consistent
with poor measurement of productivity growth.  Since the problem is not easy to fix, and
theory is unambiguous about productivity’s role in generating grease, we continue to
prefer specifications that include both inflation and productivity changes.
c.  Adding Controls for Trend and Unemployment
Cyclical factors or secular trends could augment the level of employer wage-
change dispersion or the pace of occupational adjustment, and these could be correlated
with measures of inflation.  Thus, table 7 reports the result of adding controls for time
trend and the unemployment rate.
The first specification repeats the results from the last specification of table 6, for
comparison purposes.  The second adds a time trend and its square.  While taking account
of the trend improves the fits substantially (by about double), the implied maxima and the
shape of the CPI+ relationships are stable -- the grease and sand effects are independent
of the trends.  The estimated coefficients on trend imply that the average pace of
adjustments in both these components is rising.  For the occupation component, this result
suggests growing wage flexibility or, perhaps, increased frequency or size of shocks.
Ultimately, such changes would be expected to alter grease and/or sand relationships.
Results of adding the unemployment rate vary more between components.
Employer wage-change dispersion is unaffected by the unemployment rate:  fit worsens
and the sand coefficients are unchanged.  While the grease coefficients are also
                                                                                                                                                
in effect.18
unchanged, occupational adjustments clearly respond strongly to cyclical factors, pointing
to another intriguing difference in behavior between the occupation and employer
components.
This result rules out a compositional interpretation of our findings.  Reder (1955)
argues that employers hire lower-quality workers during expansions than recessions.  If
three additional conditions hold (i.e., low-quality workers receive lower wage changes
within cell, inflation level and unemployment rate are negatively correlated, and these
quality differences vary by employer and/or occupation), our results could reflect
systematic variations in worker quality.  However, if this was the correct interpretation of
our results, then including the jobless rate -- a better measure of labor market conditions -
- should reduce the size and significance of the estimated coefficients on CPI+.  The
strong association between occupational adjustments and joblessness supports Reder’s
hypothesis.  Nevertheless, unemployment’s lack of impact on the grease coefficients
constitutes strong evidence that this hypothesis cannot explain our results.
Thus, while trend and cyclical factors influence the variance of both components
of wage adjustments, their omission does not appear to bias the grease and sand
estimates.  This result increases our confidence in the grease and sand interpretation of
our findings and justifies our preference for the parsimonious basic model for exposition.
d.  Inflation Surprises Versus Expected Inflation
The grease effect results from the leeway provided by expected or experienced
inflation, but not by inflation surprises.  On the other hand, price-level surprises are
sufficient to cause the sand effect in the presence of timing rigidities.  Thus, separating
expected inflation from surprises provides another check on the identification strategy.  A
priori, we expect occupation wage-change variation to rise mostly with expected
inflation.  Inflation surprises should have their primary effect on employer wage
adjustments.
Our measure of firms’ inflation expectations is the (beginning-of-the-period)
University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers’ mean inflation expectations.  This series19
provides a consistent measure over the entire sample period and has been shown to be an
unbiased predictor of future price increases (Bryan and Gavin, 1986).
Table 8 splits the grease and sand effects between expectations and surprises.  The
first model repeats results from the third column of table 6, for comparison purposes.
The second, third, and fourth models show the impact of expected and surprise inflation
separately and together.  Looking at the significance of the coefficients, the R
2s, and the
implied maxima, the results are quite stark.  As predicted, a surprise sharply raises
employer wage-change dispersion, whereas expectations dominate for the occupational
adjustments.  Also, the expected/surprise distinction clearly improves the fit of the
employer regression, while contributing no explanatory power for occupational
adjustments.  Finally, these estimates strongly suggest that the sand effects caused by
inflationary surprises may be unbounded, while any impact on occupational adjustments
is quickly exhausted.
Because they are very difficult to explain otherwise, these results provide
particularly strong support for the grease and sand interpretation of our findings.
e.  Might Inflation Also Speed Intended Firm Adjustments?
An important possibility to consider is whether employers’ inflation-induced wage
adjustment variation may be intentional, rather than sand.  This would be the case if
inflation allowed firms more scope to reduce average wage differentials in response to
negative shocks.  For example, they might intend to induce quits to allow shrinkage, or to
reduce shared rents.  We consider such an interpretation inconsistent with our findings for
the following reasons.
First, prior studies lead us to expect sand effects among firms.  The sand literature
for product markets finds consistent evidence of inflation induced price-change variation
(for the closest example see Lach and Tsiddon, 1992).  If inflation has no similar effect
on wages, information must be better in labor markets, or menu costs or other sources of
rigidity must be lower.  None of these is likely.  Certainly if better inflation forecasts were
available in corporate personnel offices, it would be shared with their sales offices.  Menu
costs in salary administration are high enough that salaries are rarely reviewed more than20
annually, while many product prices are changed much more often.  So, there is good
reason to expect a sand effect for wages among firms.
Second, the circumstances under which inflation would play a grease role between
firms are quite limited.  As we discuss above, it is unusual for a firm to want to change its
market position.  Indeed, in these data, autocorrelations for employers’ fixed wage effects
one and ten years apart are 0.93 and 0.62, respectively (Groshen and Levine, 1997).  Most
effort is directed at maintaining, not adjusting, the market position.  However, firms
under severe duress do cut nominal wages (Bewley and Brainard, 1993; Blinder and
Choi, 1990; and Levine, 1993).  Thus, the conditions under which a firm would resort to
using inflation to adjust relative wages are rather narrow:  a shock large enough to
fundamentally alter its labor market strategy, but not big enough for it to openly admit the
problem and cut nominal wages.
Even then, it is unclear why a firm in these intermediate circumstances would
reduce wages for all workers (risking a general decline in effort) rather than those of the
particular occupations it needed to shed.
If, however, such circumstances were common enough to drive many of firms’
inflation-induced wage changes in the CSS, then there would be no reason to expect
markedly different employer and occupation wage responses to inflation.  For example,
the effect of inflation on wage-change densities and standard deviations should be similar
for the two components, not distinctly different.  In particular, since downward wage
rigidity would be a factor, we should see evidence of truncation in the low-inflation
employer density in figure 2A -- which we do not.  Also, the later peak in firms’ standard
deviation regressions would be unexpected.  Finally, inflation surprises should not raise
firm wage-change variation at all -- let alone more than expected inflation.
Thus, labor market sand effects are anticipated and the circumstances under which
inflation would relax a constraint imposed by downward wage rigidity on firm
differentials are likely to be rare.  Indeed, if they are not rare, we have a puzzle:  what
explains the striking differences between employer and occupation adjustment patterns
under inflation?  By contrast, these differences are fully explicable, indeed expected,
under the identification strategy.  Therefore, our findings are consistent with a sand21
interpretation for inflation-induced firm wage shifts and inconsistent with a grease
interpretation.
6.  Implications of Results
This section considers the net impact of inflation on the economy.  We motivate
the question by examining the aggregate relationship between inflation and joblessness.
Next we present two approaches to estimating the extent to which grease and sand effects
estimated here offset each other. Finally, we contrast our approaches and conclusions
with those contained in two recent studies of inflation’s grease effect.
a.  The Aggregate Relationship Between Inflation and Unemployment
As a first pass at considering the net impact of grease and sand we plot the
aggregate relationship between inflation and unemployment.  While other factors beyond
grease and sand undoubtedly influence this relationship, it is useful to apprise ourselves
of the historical correspondence in the US before proceeding to more direct estimates of
the net impact of inflation on unemployment.  In particular, has higher inflation been
associated with lower US unemployment--as would be the case, ceteris paribus, if the
grease effect dominated the sand effect?  Or higher joblessness, if sand effects dominate?
Figure 4 plots US civilian unemployment against CPI+ from 1956 though 1996.
The fitted regression line makes it clear that what little relationship exists between the
two series suggests that more inflation is associated with higher, not lower, rates of
unemployment.  This aggregate relationship is fully consistent with the results obtained
here and with long-run cross-country correlations of GDP growth and inflation across
OECD countries (Andres and Hernando, 1997).
However, figure 4 stands in direct contradiction to the predictions of grease-only
estimates.  Thus, the grease effect must either be offset by sand -- as our findings suggest
-- or small relative to other factors that drive the relationship between unemployment and
inflation.22
b.  Net Impact of Grease and Sand Effects -- General Approach
We offer two ways to translate our results into an indication of inflation’s net
impact on the economy.  The first approach derives from the assumption that employers
find any deviation from their intended wage rates costly, both in ways that increase the
unemployment rate and in ways that do not.  The second way simulates unemployment
consequences of the two effects, for comparability to previous studies.
Our first approach uses inflation-induced wage variation to measure the welfare
consequences of inflation.  The reasoning follows directly from the model used in
Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) and has the advantage of including the full range of
impacts on firms.  Whatever their source (lack of grease or too much sand), variations
from intended wage changes are costly for firms.  If the wages are too high, these costs
take the form of decreased profits, retained earnings, or investment, or lower production
and market share (as the result of laying off overpaid workers).  If wages are set too low,
the costs come from undesired turnover, extended vacancies, or lower morale and
productivity.  For firms and workers the losses from mispricing are symmetric across the
two effects.  That is, the impact differs by whether the deviation is up or down, but not by
whether its source is lack of grease or too much sand.  Hence, the two impacts of inflation
can be compared if they are measured equally well, in the same units, in the same market.
Therefore, our first approach simply nets the inflation-induced impacts on wage
variation.  Figure 5 plots these net benefits using the extended data.  The horizontal axis
measures inflation (controlling for productivity), while the vertical axis measures the
standard deviation of log wage-changes.  For grease, sand and net benefits two lines are
drawn: a smooth line for the fitted quadratic relationship, and a kinked line for the
nonparametric version of the same relationship.  The sand (employer) and grease
(occupation) lines are identical to those shown in figures 3A and 3B, respectively.  Grease
effects are taken as positive, while the sand effect is negative (although plotted in the
positive quadrant for consistency with figure 3A).
Net benefits are calculated assuming that gross benefits and costs of inflation are
zero when the inflation rate is zero, and that productivity growth is 1.5 percent, using the
following relationship (suppressing the time subscript):23
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where stdem and stdoc are the predicted standard deviations of the employer and
occupation components (using columns 2 and 4 of table 5, respectively).
As in the original sample, these estimates suggest a small net benefit for inflation
rates below 5 percent.  The peak remains at 2
1/2 percent, and net benefits at the peak
remain an order of magnitude less than gross grease benefits.  Bootstrapped standard
errors around the net benefits estimate are wide enough that they never rule out a net loss
from inflation, or a higher gain.  However, they conclusively rule out both equality
between gross and net benefits, and flat (rather than declining) net benefits at higher rates
of inflation.
From this exercise we conclude that while inflation’s net benefits are maximized
at low levels of inflation, the impact is modest at best.  This is because rising sand effects
mostly offset the gross grease benefits, leaving little net improvement.  Although this
approach to calculating net benefits does not directly map into more common metrics,
such as output or job losses, it has the distinct advantage of accounting for all costs
imposed on firms and workers.  While some of the above-mentioned costs of unintended
wage variation will affect unemployment, others may not.  Particularly if workers’ human
capital is very firm-specific, employers and employees have less incentive to sever
relationships over a short-lived deviation.  Thus, impacts on profitability, morale, and
productivity may well be larger than observed unemployment effects.  Hence, as the best
summary of our findings, we prefer this formulation, because it does not unduly confine
the measurement of impacts.
c.  Net Impact of Grease and Sand Effects -- Simulated Unemployment
However, for policy purposes and for comparison with previous studies, an
estimate of the unemployment impact of the grease and sand effects measured in the CSS
is desirable.  This section first explains why such an estimate cannot be derived directly
from the CSS, and then describes the simulation we use to address the question.24
The statistical model in Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) is designed to detect wage
rigidity and uncertainty effects, not employment impacts.  Several of the model’s features
are not suited to a direct translation of our results into joblessness.  First, the structure of
the data does not allow a reliable measurement of aggregate employment effects.  For
example, in most years the population of workers in the occupation cells is unknown.
Second, the identification strategy does not completely determine all sources of wage
variation.  Indeed, the approximately 70 percent of wage-change variation remaining in
the residual might include unidentified grease and sand effects.  Third, unemployment
depends on total wage deviations from equilibrium wages, so all components should be
accumulated before any impact can be discerned.  Thus, unemployment effects cannot be
estimated directly from the CSS.  However, the parameters of the CSS can be used to
craft a simulation that illuminates unemployment effects.
To clarify the underlying source of wage change variation that could account for
data like the CSS, we generate artificial data consistent with key features of the CSS.  The
Appendix describes the simulation in more detail.  The simulated data mimic the CSS in
three dimensions:  an identical firm, occupation, city structure;  the same levels of overall
variation by year, city, occupation, firm, and residual; and, regression coefficients
approximately matching those in the CSS.
Having simulated the data, we next build on the assumption that job losses occur
when grease or sand effects drive workers’ final wage changes away from equilibrium.
The size and frequency of these deviations (combined with elasticities of labor demand
and supply) determine the unemployment rate.  For truncated wage-changes, only the
labor demand elasticity comes into play, because truncation can only raise wage
adjustments.  Drawing on Hamermesh (1993), we apply a range of uncompensated
demand elasticities from -0.1 to -0.5.  For sand effects, which can be either positive or
negative, supply elasticities also matter.  We use uncompensated labor supply elasticities
from 0.0 to 0.6, reflecting widely-varying implied estimates when both men and women
are in the market (Pencavel, 1986; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986).
Figure 6 shows simulated total unemployment effects of inflation due to grease
and sand.  The horizontal axis measures CPI+, while the vertical axis reports percentage25
points of unemployment.  The data are sparse at high and low inflation.  Therefore, ends
of the curves are determined by the average effect for extreme observations, which are
plotted as corresponding to the average lowest and highest CPI+ values of 2.8 and 11.8
percent, respectively.15  Note that a CPI+ value of 2.8 percent corresponds to a very low
rate of inflation (near one percent), once productivity growth of 1.5 percent (the average
over this period) and any positive biases in the CPI are accounted for.
Over the range that inflation has net beneficial effects, the line will slope down:
the steeper the slope, the greater the benefits.  Net disruptive effects will be seen as a
positive slope.  The five lines on the figure correspond to different assumed supply and
demand elasticities.  As a baseline, we consider a symmetric case (0.3 labor supply
elasticity, -0.3 labor demand elasticity), seen as the line with squares in figure 6.  At low
rates of inflation, the downward wage rigidity underlying the grease effect causes
unemployment.  As inflation rises, the grease effect lowers unemployment.  However,
inflation also raises sand-induced joblessness.  Thus, the line shows a mild U-shape.
Over the downward sloping portion (from CPI+ of 2.8 to 6 percent), there is little net
unemployment impact (less than 0.1 percentage points) of inflation.  Beyond that, the
grease-effect unemployment reductions become trivial and sand effects continue to grow.
There is no evidence of a strong nonlinearity as inflation gets very low.
Higher elasticities of labor demand raise inflation-related unemployment because
employers are more likely to lay off workers in response to higher-than-notional wages
(see the line for supply elasticity of 0.3 and demand elasticity of -0.5).  The net effect line
shifts up fairly uniformly because both grease and sand effects rise, leading to more
unemployment at high and low levels of inflation.  The slope of the line (which is the net
effect of additional inflation on unemployment) remains almost flat, except at high levels.
Labor supply elasticity, on the other hand, affects only sand-induced joblessness.
More elastic supply emphasizes the sand effects.  The less elastic is supply, the smaller
the sand effect, so grease effects dominate.  However, even the extreme example shown
                                                
15 To construct these endpoints, we aggregate all observations with CPI+ of less that 3.5 or more
than 9.5 and estimated mean grease and sand effects.  In figure 6, these mean effects are assigned to CPI+
values of 2.9 and 11 percent, respectively -- because these are the mean CPI+ values for the extreme
observations.26
in figure 6 (perfectly inelastic supply with demand elasticity of -0.3) generates only a 0.2
percentage point drop in unemployment for a 5 percentage point increase in inflation
(from CPI+ of 2.8 to 8.0).
To sum up: In this section we simulate a wage-change generating process modeled
on the structure of the CSS.  Simulated observations allow us to estimate unemployment
impacts of grease and sand.  The exercise shows that even under extreme assumptions
about the elasticities of labor demand and supply, grease and sand effects almost fully
offset each other at low to moderate rates of inflation.  In particular, under a wide range
of elasticities of labor supply and demand, we find no evidence that very low rates of
inflation raise unemployment noticeably.
d.  Comparison of Results With Recent Wage Rigidity Studies
How do these results compare with recent studies of inflation’s effect on wage-
setting?  We focus on Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) [AD&P] and Card and Hyslop
(1995) [C&H], since they are very recent studies.16
We begin by listing three important ways in which our work differs from both
studies.  First, neither AD&P nor C&H considers offsetting sand effects.  Second, our
analysis and model are tightly linked to actual wage adjustment procedures.  Our firm-
level data allow us to identify and interpret wage rigidities unobservable in household
surveys.  Third, neither study analyzes micro-level wage changes spanning the range of
years (and thus, the range of inflation rates) covered in the CSS.  In particular, neither
study includes low-inflation years in the 1950s, 1960s and 1990s.  Thus, implications
they derive about low inflation are largely out-of-sample extrapolations.
Nevertheless, broadly speaking, our empirical results for the grease effect are
consistent with findings in both studies:  downward wage rigidity binds more at low rates
of inflation, so higher inflation has some beneficial gross effects.  We now contrast our
study with the two others in turn.
                                                
16 Other fairly recent studies of the grease effects include Kahn (1995); McLaughlin (1994) and
Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1993).  All three perform micro-level tests of downward wage rigidity.27
AD&P has three main sections.  The first examines wide-ranging, new and old
empirical evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity.  Next, it models and emulates
grease affects to show that (for plausible values of parameters) this rigidity could raise
unemployment substantially at low inflation rates.  Third, it converts the simulation
model to one that can be estimated on aggregate data, and shows that out-of-sample
predictions from the model can emulate Depression-era unemployment patterns.  Thus,
AD&P concludes that low inflation is very costly in the labor market.
In the empirical section, AD&P considers the spike at zero in the density of wage
changes to be key evidence of downward wage rigidity.  We argue that while the spike is
a likely prediction, it may not be either necessary or sufficient.  It is not necessary
evidence if constrained workers are laid off.  It is not sufficient because zero is a double
rounding point (in even dollars and percentage points), potentially creating a large
spurious concentration at zero.  For those reasons, we consider inflation’s impact on
wage-change variation a preferable measure (particularly in the CSS, which does not
report individual wages).  Nevertheless, our findings agree with AD&P’s qualitative
conclusion that the grease effect exists.
The contrast with our study centers on unemployment effects in our simulation
exercises.  The marked difference in conclusions reflects divergent structures for wage-
change variation.  To explicitly consider the effect of errors and other randomness, we
observe and, thus, generate firm-based wage variation (0.036 log points when CPI+ is 5
percent) that rises with inflation, plus a constant residual variation (0.080 log points).  To
reflect persistent market shocks, we add constant occupation variation (0.028 log points).
By contrast, AD&P’s underlying structure is constant with respect to inflation, has a
single component (the firm) and generates a much smaller standard deviation of log
wage-changes (0.028) than we observe in the CSS.  AD&P’s firm effects are most
comparable to our occupation effects in size and in variance with inflation.  Their demand
shocks affect firms, while ours act on both firms and skills.  Thus, AD&P implicitly
assumes that there are no distinct occupational markets, or that firms employ only one
occupation at a time.28
The AD&P simulation also assumes a fairly high rate of truncation for constrained
wages -- not much different from ours.  At low rates of inflation, the CSS data on which
we base our simulation show no sign of nonlinearity.  By contrast, AD&P’s extrapolated
simulation produces a highly non-linear region at low inflation rates.  Indeed, this is the
range on which they base their strongest policy conclusions.
C&H performs a more detailed analysis of the effect of wage rigidity in the March
Current Population Survey (CPS), 1979 to 1993, and the Michigan Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), 1976 to 1979 and 1985 to 1988.  They consider the impact that wage
rigidity would have on the distribution of changes, accounting for errors and rounding.
Then they generate a counterfactual, unconstrained distribution to gauge the effects of
wage rigidity.  Despite some assumptions that might bias down their estimated effect,
they detect evidence of substantial wage rigidity under low inflation.  In contrast to the
CSS sample used here, C&H has no information on firms and few low-inflation years.
The final part of C&H detects little or no macro impact of a net grease effect at
the market level.  A state-level comparison of the relationship between nominal wage
changes and unemployment (using CPS files from 1976 to 1992) yields only a small,
statistically insignificant relationship.  Although C&H offer little explanation for the
apparent contradiction between their individual and aggregate results, their findings can
be easily explained by the existence of the sand effect which they do not measure at the
micro level.  Indeed, their findings, if not their interpretations, are compatible with those
presented above.
Thus, the evidence for the grease effect in the CSS is consistent with micro-level
findings in AD&P and C&H.  In addition, our simulated unemployment results can
explain the lack of relationship between inflation and state-level unemployment rates
found in C&H.  By contrast, our findings suggest that the AD&P simulations -- which
predict a strong unemployment cost for low inflation -- appear to be largely an artifact of
extrapolation in a model that ignores sand effects.29
7.  Conclusions
Our companion study finds evidence that inflation stimulates both beneficial
intermarket and distortionary intramarket wage changes.  The identification strategy for
this conclusion is that inflation-induced occupational adjustments represent beneficial
grease, while inflation-induced wage-changes among employers reflect distortionary sand
in the labor market.  This paper examines forty years of CSS data in order to judge the
appropriateness of this key identification strategy.  We also check whether downward
wage rigidity has relaxed in recent years, reducing our need for inflation’s grease.
One form of support for the assumption is that many important institutional
features of the wage-setting process accord well with the formal model used to generate
the hypotheses tested.  In addition, we present a variety of independent empirical findings
that all provide further support.  Table 9 summarizes these findings.  Probes 4 and 5 are
more fully described in our companion paper.  The others are presented above.
No single probe can be fully convincing on its own.  However, the combined
weight of these varied findings sustain the validity of the identification strategy.  Indeed,
these findings (such as inflation expectations being the sole source of the inflation-
induced occupation effects, while surprises matter more for employer effects) are very
difficult to explain if the strategy is not valid.  Thus, the grease and sand interpretation of
inflation-induced occupation and employer wage adjustments holds up well to close
scrutiny.
The second question -- whether wage rigidity has relaxed in recent years -- finds
the following support:
· The pace of occupational wage adjustments in the past years is
consistently much higher than would be predicted, based on the historical
relationships and the current level of inflation.  The same does not hold
true for employer wage-change dispersion.
· Over time, occupational wage-change dispersion shows a statistically
significant upward trend, with a lot of explanatory power.  While this is
also true among employers, it explains much less variation over time.
Although it would be premature to claim that this evidence constitutes proof of the US
economy’s reduced need for inflationary grease, our findings do point in that direction.
This result is particularly intriguing because large firms are precisely the segment of the30
labor market where wages are thought to be most rigid.  More research is clearly
warranted in this area.
What implications do these findings have for policy?  Both buttress the
conclusion that low-inflation regimes may not raise unemployment or impair the smooth
functioning of labor markets.  Even if one accepts previous estimates of the grease effect
at full face value, our results suggest that the net labor market benefits of inflation are an
order of magnitude smaller, because of inflation’s simultaneous sand effect.  And they
may be shrinking further.  Thus, the labor market provides little guidance on which
inflation goal to choose in a low-inflation regime.Table 1
Description of the Annual Wage Adjustment Data Set
Drawn from the Updated CSS, 1956-1996
Total Number of Job-Cell Wage Adjustments Observed 75,765
Number of Years of Changes 40
Average Number of Observations Per Year 1,894
Mean Log Wage Adjustment 0.048
Standard Deviation of Log Wage Adjustment 0.084
Number of Occupation*City*Year Observations 6,187
Avg. No. of Occupation*City Observations Per Year 155
Number of Employer-years 3,002
Average Number of Employers Per Year 75
Note:  All numbers reported are for the first-differenced data set.
Source:  Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community
Salary Survey.Table 2
Description of CSS Data by Year
End Number of: Mean Log Wage Adjustment in:
Year Job cells Occupations* Employers Cleveland Cincinnati Pittsburgh
1957  1,336    94    73  0.051 0.046  0.045
1958  1,557    94    83  0.049 0.054  0.050
1959  1,714   103    88  0.040 0.048  0.070
1960  1,669   103    86  0.036 0.032  0.034
1961  1,701   103    88  0.039 0.035  0.036
1962  1,881   109    93  0.024 0.022  0.024
1963  1,910   112    90  0.019 0.026  0.024
1964  2,032   113    96  0.026 0.022  0.023
1965  2,123   124    95  0.021 0.026  0.010
1966  1,965   125    89  0.040 0.045  0.038
1967  1,967   125    89  0.037 0.042  0.035
1968  2,128   124    94  0.046 0.044  0.042
1969  1,972   114    97  0.066 0.050  0.049
1970    853    49    36  0.068 ** **
1971    854    49    36  0.061 ** **
1972  1,262    66    38  0.061 ** **
1973  1,477    90    57  0.056 0.095 **
1974  1,335    96    73  0.126 0.084  0.139
1975  1,379   101    73  0.074 0.063  0.090
1976  1,391   104    72  0.065 0.057  0.078
1977    789    60    72  0.030 0.021  0.052
1978  1,674   197    68  0.052 0.063  0.066
1979  2,418   267    75  0.064 0.071  0.069
1980  2,689   295    79  0.095 0.074  0.087
1981  2,196   186    83  0.086 0.089  0.059
1982  2,185   193    82  0.072 0.092  0.078
1983  2,013   190    75  0.050 0.055  0.073
1984  2,274   213    80  0.047 0.058  0.063
1985  2,272   212    79  0.040 0.044  0.042
1986  2,396   220    82  0.042 0.044  0.037
1987  2,437   226    80  0.031 0.037  0.038
1988  2,401   222    82  0.036 0.037  0.023
1989  2,407   225    81  0.045 0.041  0.036
1990  2,505   222    84  0.052 0.046  0.024
1991  2,536   223    89  0.038 0.045  0.035
1992  2,398   223    84  0.039 0.042  0.043
1993 2,355 223 89  0.032 0.026  0.040
1994 2,128 223 84  0.027 0.029  0.025
1995 1,841 241 69  0.027 0.031  0.019
1996 1,345 240 51  0.040 0.032  0.030
Total 75,765 6,187 3,002  0.049 0.048  0.048
* Occupations are counted separately for each city.
** In 1970-72, the CSS is missing Cincinnati; in 1970-73, the CSS is missing Pittsburgh.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey, 1956-1996.Table 3
Means and  Standard Deviations of CSS Wage Adjustment Components
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The annual change in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban Workers (CPI-U) for
the US.
b
The annual change in the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour Worked for
the US.
c
US civilian unemployment rate.
d
Taken from the Michigan Survey of Inflation Expectations.
eCPI-U minus expected inflation.
Note:  Total number of observations: 113.
Sources: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community
Salary Survey, 1956-1996.  US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Michigan Survey.Table 4
ANOVA of Annual Wage Adjustments




















City 2 0.3 0.0 0.1 12.3
Year 39 30.6 5.8 21.1 119.7
Year*City 71 3.4 0.6 2.3 7.2
Occ*Year*City 6,186 45.2 8.5 31.1 1.2
Employer*Year 3,001 65.9 12.4 45.4 4.3
Model 9,299 145.3 27.4 100.0
Residual 66,465 385.2 72.6
Total 75,764 530.5 100.0
*The three cities are Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh.  The years are 1956-1957 through 1995-
1996.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary
Survey.Table 5
Basic Regressions of the Standard Deviation
of Employer and Occupation Wage Adjustments on Wage Inflation:
Original and Extended Samples
Dependent Variable -- Standard Deviation of Wage
Adjustment Components:
Employer Occupation
Model 1957-1992 1957-1996 1957-1992 1957-1996
Intercept 0.012 0.015 0.004 0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
CPI+* 0.394 0.323 0.458 0.427
(0.198) (0.177) (0.136) (0.137)
Squared CPI+* -1.475 -1.104 -2.293 -2.301
(1.227) (1.120) (0.843) (0.865)
Adjusted R
2 0.138 0.121 0.151 0.089
No. of Observations 101 113 101 113
F Stat. for joint test,
1% cutoff £ 4.8
9.0 8.7 9.9 6.5
Implied CPI+*
Maxima
13.4% 14.6% 10.0% 9.3%
*CPI+ is the sum of the annual change in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban
Workers (CPI-U) and the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour Worked.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community
Salary Survey, 1956-1996.Table 6
Regressions of the Standard Deviation of Employer and Occupation Wage Adjustments
on CPI and Output/Hour Separately
Dependent Variable -- Standard Deviation of Wage Adjustment Components:
Employer Occupation
Model 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Intercept 0.015 0.021 0.024 0.014 0.007 0.017 0.015 0.006
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
CPI+* 0.323 0.403 0.427 0.589
(0.177) (0.182) (0.137) (0.129)
Squared CPI+* -1.104 -1.683 -2.301 -3.480
(1.120) (1.162) (0.865) (0.823)
CPI-U 0.119 0.136 0.219 0.293
(0.097) (0.090) (0.068) (0.065)
Squared CPI-U 0.456 -0.108 -0.771 -1.377
(0.723) (0.570) (0.513) (0.415)
D Output/Hour 0.224 -0.096 0.085 -0.197












8.7 4.9 8.6 6.9 6.5 9.5 14.0 13.2
Implied Maxima
CPI+* 14.6% 12.0% 9.3% 8.5%
CPI ¥ 63.0% 14.2% 10.6%
D Output/Hour 3.0% 0.9%
*CPI+ is the sum of the annual change in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban Workers (CPI-
U) and the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour Worked.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Number of Observations:  113.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey,
1956-1996.Table 7
Regressions of the Standard Deviation
of Employer and Occupation Wage Adjustments
on CPI+ with Unemployment and Trend Controls
Dependent Variable -- Standard Deviation of Wage Adjustment Components:
Employer Occupation
Model 4 5 6 4 5 6
Intercept 0.014 78.899 0.013 0.006 68.852 -0.024
(0.006) (34.162) (0.016) (0.004) (20.078) (0.010)
CPI+* 0.403 0.658 0.407 0.589 0.471 0.589
(0.182) (0185) (0.187) (0.129) (0.109) (0.119)
Squared CPI+* -1.683 -2.974 -1.709 -3.480 -2.435 -3.593
(1.162) (1.155) (1.191) (0.823) (0.679) (0.761)
D Output/Hour -0.096 -0.185 -0.096 -0.197 -0.147 -0.209


















2 0.136 0.223 0.120 0.246 0.534 0.374
F Stat. joint test,
1% cutoff £ 4.8
6.9 7.4 4.0 13.2 26.7 14.4
Implied CPI+*
Maxima
12.0% 11.1% 11.9% 8.5% 9.7% 8.3%
*CPI+ is the sum of the annual change in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban Workers (CPI-U)
and the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour Worked.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Number of Observations:  113.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey,
1956-1996.Table 8
Regressions of the Standard Deviation of Employer and Occupation Wage Adjustments
on Inflation Expectations and Surprises Separately
Dependent Variable -- Standard Deviation of Wage Adjustment Components:
Employer Occupation
Model 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.024 0.033 0.030 0.034 0.031 0.015 0.013 0.023 0.013 0.016
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
CPI-U 0.136 0.293
(0.090) (0.065)
Sq. CPI-U -0.108 -1.377
(0.570) (0.415)
Expected -0.241 -0.246 -0.225 0.330 0.326 0.306
Inflation (0.145) (0.137) (0.137) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105)
Sq. Expected 2.981 3.067 3.208 -1.790 -1.668 -1.803
Inflation (1.230) (1.185) (1.181) (0.897) (0.911) (0.903)
Inflation 0.173 0.218 0.268 0.046 0.081 0.033
Surprise (0.062) (0.061) (0.070) (0.049) (0.047) (0.053)
Sq. Inflation 0.238 -1.546 -1.832 0.463 -0.991 -0.718
Surprise (1.198) (1.317) (1.322) (0.959) (1.013) (1.012)
D Output/Hr. 0.106 -0.101
(0.070) (0.053)
Adjusted R




8.6 5.30 8.08 6.94 6.08 14.0 10.38 1.60 6.01 5.63
Implied Maxima
CPI-U 63.0% 10.6%
Expected ¥ ¥ ¥ 9.2% 9.8% 8.5%
Surprise ¥ 7.1% 7.3% ¥ 4.1% 2.3%
*CPI+ is the sum of the annual change in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban Workers (CPI-
U) and the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour Worked.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Number of Observations:  113.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey,
1956-1996.Table 9
Summary of Evidence in Support of Identification Strategy
Probe Finding Consistent with grease and
sand interpretation?





Employer and occupational wage
changes are almost fully separable
and distinguishable statistically,
even though data are unbalanced.
Yes.  Consistent with two-stage
wage-setting procedure.






evidence of truncation under low
inflation.  No such effect for
employer wage changes;  lower
inflation simply thins both tails.
Yes.  Consistent with downward
rigidity constraining wage cuts
for occupations under low
inflation, and reducing errors or
lags by firms.
3.  Compare peak of
occupation and
employer effects
The pace of occupational
adjustments slows at inflation rates
above 5%.  Employer wage-change
dispersion shows a higher (perhaps
unbounded) peak.  Finding is robust
over all specifications examined.
Yes.  Consistent with a grease
effect bounded by the size of real
shocks to skill groups, while
inflation-induced disagreement
among employers has no limit
without indexation.





Little qualitative impact.  The shape
of the employer relationship is
driven by short-term changes;  the
shape of the occupation relationship
is driven by long-term adjustments.
Yes.  Consistent with occupation
adjustments reflecting long-term
market movements and employer
deviations being errors and
corrections.
5.  Use panel speci-






somewhat earlier, employer effects
peak later, if at all.
Yes.  Rules out spurious
autocorrelations and fixed effects
as the source of the estimated
relationships.




The pace of occupational
adjustments rises only with inflation
expectations -- not with surprises.
Inflation surprises matter more than
expectations for raising employer
disagreement.
Yes.  Consistent with expected
inflation providing leeway for
intended occupational
adjustments, while price-level
surprises cause more unintended
adjustments among employers.




Little qualitative impact.  But,
independent of inflation,
occupational adjustments rise
strongly with unemployment, while
employer adjustments are
unaffected.
Yes.  Rules out interpretations of
the results as the product of time,
business cycles or trends
correlated with the level of
inflation, such as worker-quality


















Css Mean Wage Change CPI+Figure 2A:  Density of CSS Employer Adjustments During High and Low
Inflation Years
Log Wage Change Deviations
Figure 2B:  Density of CSS Occupational Adjustments During High and Low
Inflation Years
Log Wage Change DeviationsFigure 3A:  Standard Deviations of CSS Employer Adjustments Associated
with CPI+ on Extended Sample:  Nonparametric and Regression
Predictions
Inflation + Productivity Growth (CPI+)
Figure 3B:  Standard Deviations of CSS Occupational Adjustments
Associated with CPI+ on Extended Sample:  Nonparametric and
Regression Predictions
Inflation + Productivity Growth (CPI+)
Note:  In each case, the smooth line is the fitted quadratic relationship, while the
kinked line is the nonparametric version of the same relationship.Figure 4:  Aggregate Relationship Between US Unemployment Rate and CPI+ (CPI-U Plus Change in
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Regression FitFigure 5:  Estimated Net Effects of Inflation, Using Extended CSS Sample




Note:  In each case, the smooth line is the fitted quadratic relationship, while the kinked
line is the nonparametric version of the same relationship.  The horizontal axis measures
effects of inflation on the standard deviation of log wage changes.  The grease effect is
assumed to be beneficial because the adjustments are intended responses to changing
labor market conditions among occupations.  The sand effect is disruptive because it
reflects unintended deviations from parity with other employers -- due to errors or lags.
Net benefits also assume that gross benefits and costs of inflation are zero when the
inflation rate is zero.Figure 6:  Simulated Net Effects of CPI+ (CPI-U Plus Change in Output/Hour) on Unemployment,




































Inflation + Productivity Growth (CPI+)31
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Appendix
Description of Unemployment Simulation Exercise
This section describes the process used to arrive at the unemployment simulations
results reported in the text and figure 6.  We generate artificial data consistent with
various key features of the CSS.
The simulated data are constructed to mimic the CSS in three ways: 1) an
identical firm, occupation, city structure to that shown in tables 1 and 2, so that any
limitations on the identification strategy due to the number of cells with given
characteristics is replicated;  2) the same levels of overall variation by year, city,
occupation, firm, and residual, as seen in table 4; and, 3) regression coefficients
approximately matching the basic (stage two) estimates shown in table 5.  From these
results we calculate unemployment impacts for grease and sand, using labor supply and
demand elasticities estimated elsewhere.
Underlying wage-changes are assigned a trend equal to inflation plus productivity
growth.  Around that trend, we allow the following five sources of variation:  occupation,
firm (uncorrelated with inflation and general productivity growth), firm uncertainty, city,
and residual (which accounts for all other sources of wage change variation).  If the total
wage-change sums to less than zero, it is truncated with a fixed probability.
The parameterization we use parallels results in Stages 1 and 2 of the CSS
statistical model.  In any year, both firm and occupation effects are allowed to vary 12
percent as much as total wage changes.  Firm variation also rises with inflation and
productivity (CPI+).  The slope of the relationship -- 0.18 -- was chosen so that the sand
component accounts for half of total firm variation.  Variation in the raw (pre-truncated)
residual is set slightly greater than the total CSS variation -- so that ANOVA results for
post-truncation simulated data resemble those observed in Stage 1.  Independent city
variation is set to zero, because the firm variation already generates comparable city
effects.  Firms truncate the wages of workers with negative total (raw) wage changes 75
percent of the time.  This frequency of truncation replicates Stage 2 grease estimates.